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nounced. But the suggestion is more powerful than the tendency to
imitate; many of those who succumbed to suggestion were not imita-
tors of their comrades. On the other hand, a few imitate in resist-
ing the suggestion. The children were regrouped and a similar test
was made, with the result that each individual adapted himself to the
new group and the laws determined in the other test were corroborated.
Subconscious Movements.—An ' autoscope,' to use Professor B.
F. Barrett's term, was made by mounting a hammer so that it would
swing up and down gently, supported by a spring. The child held the
mallet head in the hand behind a screen and was required to look at
a metronome and count the beats. The experimenter ' primed ' the
movement by causing the hammer to swing in time with the metro-
nome, about ten times. The test consisted in determining to what ex-
tent the child would continue the movement automatically after hav-
ing been thus started. A classification of the children in regard to
the definiteness and duration of these automatic movements is given.
A second test was made in which a pencil was used in place of the
hammer. The experimenter communicated simple writing move-
ments and these were often continued automatically. The children
were generally conscious of the movement. These tests demonstrate
the possibility of making quick and significant tests on automatism
under normal conditions. They also show that automatism of action
is not synonymous with automatism of judgment.
This bare description of the tests conveys no adequate idea of
the author's ingenuity, erudition, tact and fairness in the manipulation
of an experiment and the interpretation of its results. He is a worthy
leader in this field of research. He has proved more than he set out
to prove. Not only has he demonstrated a relation between normal
suggestion and hypnosis, and between normal automatism and the
spiritualistic phenomena of automatism by ready methods, but he has
contributed much to our knowledge of the child mind and the theory
of applied psychology. Instead of injuring the children he claims to
have benefited them by explaining the errors to which they were
subject and leading them to more accurate habits.
C. E. SEASHOUE.
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Psychologie des Willens, zur Grundlegung der Ethik. Von HER-
MANN SCHWARTZ, Privatdozent an der Universitat Halle. Leip-
zig, Wilhelm Engelmann. 1900.
The work before us is an interesting and in many ways original
contribution to the theories of value which have grown up out of psy-
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chological studies of recent years. Though in method somewhat akin
to the Austrian school, it opposes to the empiricism and relativism of
this school a doctrine of absolute norms to which the author himself
gives the name of ' Voluntaristische Apriorismus.' By this title he
would distinguish it on the one hand from the rationalism of Kant
and the intuitionists, and, on the other, from the naturalistic and het-
eronomous theories of the origin and development of values which
characterize the empirical point of view.
The phenomenology of values, as disclosed by the psychological
analysis of Schwartz, may be summed up thus: Values fall into
three distinct and ultimate classes.
(a) Values of organic condition (Zustand), mere feelings and, as
such, objects of mere desire; (6) Values of the person, such as admir-
able qualities of the person or character, beauty, fame, valor, etc.
(c) Impersonal values, social, artistic, scientific, in short all altruistic
values.
These last two classes are distinguished from the first in that they
are objects of outgoing will activity in the true sense, not of desire.
Within each of these spheres of value, preference is determined
merely by judgment of like and dislike. This is a purely analytical
preference, determined by the degrees of satisfaction (saturation of
the volitional tendencies). But the choice of one group rather than
another follows a normative law of synthetical preference. There is
in both individual and racial culture a tendency to development of
motives from the lower to the higher classes, but while the origin of
motives may be explained by principles of natural causality the
choice of one class of motives over another is explicable in both indi-
vidual and historical culture only by a synthetical principle inherent
in the will. Moreover, the inherent necessity of reason to explain
acts of will by sanctioning grounds found in the sphere of the repre-
sentations which the volition brings in its train, shows this a priori
principle of preference. In this connection the instinctive lies of
consciousness, flattering by false reasons our higher sense of values,
are instructive as showing the existence of the norms of personal and
impersonal values. These phenomena of ultimate distinctions in
values, of semi-logical development of motives in individual and
social culture, of intuitive recognition of grades of value by the sanc-
tioning consciousness, all point to synthetic a priori acts of will back
of individualistic development.
Side by side with this positive programme, the psychological
grounds for which constitute the larger portion of the work, Schwartz
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carries on a running fire of criticism against all heteronomous concep-
tions of will-determination. With special energy he maintains that the
doctrines that the will is determined by such principles as the ' Law
of Relative Increase of Pleasure' (Ehrenfels), the 'Wil l to Life or to
Power' (Schopenhauer and Nietzsche), or the logical principle of
' Universalization of Motive' (Kant), are dealing with mere abstrac-
tions, not real forces of the will. In accord with his conception of
the primacy of will as the creator of values, which is the keynote to
his position, the ground of will-determination in any real sense must
be a • Gesetzlichkeit der inneren Normen.'
The absolute dualism which his theory discloses between the
' Natur-zwang' of the merely natural laws of desire, as like and dis-
like, and the ' Norm-zwang' of synthetic preference of the will opens
a way for a doctrine of freedom which rests ultimately upon the old
Kantian principle of the indifference of norms and of nature to each
other.
This is in briefest outline the obvious part of our author's system.
Our first astonished question is : Whence these ultimate categories of
value, whence our knowledge of this ' Gesetzlichkeit der inneren
Normen,' which is active back of the naturalistic changes and devel-
opment of motives? It would be easy to grow indignant over this
bold and unmitigated dualism in method. Having shown such zeal
against the dogmatism of Kant's intellectualistic ethics, of the natur-
alistic Trieblehre of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and of the pain-
pleasure illusion and prejudice of the empiricists, has he presented us
with the last consummate illustration of the assertatory method? We
read on and on. Surely there is some logical deduction of these
categories yet to come. Kant's ethical a priori may be but a pale
spectre from the shadows of the pure reason, but at least we know its
source. We know how to estimate its credentials. But no—a bril-
liant argumentum ad hominem tells us to go to our own will. Does
it not choose personal over feeling value, impersonal over personal?
And when, in its weakness, it fails thus to choose, does it not sophisti-
cate itself with those lies of conscience which are the tributes paid by
vice to virtue? We find nothing but a reconstruction of that table of
values, attractive but powerless, which Martineau develops for us in
his Idiopsychological Ethics.
Idiopsychological is Schwartz's position throughout, and by his own
statement he has much in common with Martineau. And with such
reflections and with this classification many readers will forthwith dis-
miss the book. Such a procedure would, however, not be wholly
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just, for unpromising though the result may be there is yet back of it
a psychological point of view which is worth notice for its own sake.
In his preface we are assured by the author that an adequate psychology
of the will is a prerequisite of a true theory of ethical values a view
which we can scarcely doubt, despite the strong reactionary movement
in which we have been caught up. But immediately we are brought
face to face with the distressing uncertainty prevalent as to true psycho-
logical method. Against the empirical method and its concept of the
will as a complex of elements, we have in Schwartz the strongest in-
sistence upon the will as a special function of the soul, with its own
quasi-logical functions, independent of ideal content. Moral distinc-
tions are neither of feeling nor of thought, but are idiopsychological
and idiogenetic.
"Von dieser Antwort," says Schwartz, " hangt fur die sittliche
Betrachtung unendlich viel ab." Without doubt. If, as Schwartz's
analysis would have us believe, the function of desire is merely that of
a preparatory process to furnish the material for the analytical and syn-
thetical functions of the will, " reflexionsartige" (judgmental) proc-
esses, then indeed the real grounds of the will are not to be found in
the empirical doctrine of motives, in representation and feeling, but
in the will itself, and the entire basis for a causal method is gone.
Naturally, such being the conception of will, the causal and empirical
method of psychology is supplanted by a negative analysis, the pur-
pose of which is to show the independence of will of motivation from
without.
We find, therefore, a new doctrine of value and a new conception
of volitional sufficiency. The so-called motives of the will, representa-
tions and feelings, are not of value because they are objects of desire
or will, but become of value first by reason of the satisfaction (satura-
tion) which they bring to the impulse of will which brings them into
being. Even elemental will impulses—and this is the key to the situa-
tion—are conceived of as objectless. But these objectless 'Willens-
regungen,' by a law of concentration of ideas, bring into being a crowd
of representations among which analytical and synthetical preference
is exercised, on the basis of the satisfaction (saturation) of the impulse.
' Nicht durch das Gefallen oder den Wunsch selber sind wir uns eines
Zieles bewusst, sondern wir werden es durch eine Vorstellung die zu
ihm hinzutritt und sich nachtriiglich bildet.' The values or ends of
volition may be interpreted or known in terms of representations, but
the values consist not in objects of impulse or will, but in the satisfac-
tion of the will that calls them into being.
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This novel conception of satisfaction of the will, through satura-
tion of the will impulse, by the more or less of content, the presence
or absence of the same, in so-called analytical preferences, within
the same sphere of values, and the reaffirmation of the doctrine of
practical evidence in the sphere of synthetical preferences between
different classes of values, is one, it is to be feared, with which scien-
tific method can do nothing. From the point of view of science the
values of the will can be known only in one of two ways: either by
the ideal products of the will reconstructed logically or causally, or by
the subjective states which are the functions of will activity in con-
sciousness, these to be reconstructed either in terms of degrees of
pleasure and pain or perhaps in semi-logical terms of extension and
intension of sentiment—from the reviewer's point of view, the latter.
With the introduction of the conception of a purely practical evi-
dence of the will, abstractly conceived, the distinction of Crusius be-
tween real grounds and knowledge grounds of the will is carried to
its extremist conclusion. But how are we to know the real grounds
of the will if they are not to be found in the phenomenal motives?
If we do not reconstruct them out of the phenomenal motives, have
we not to choose between a groundless will or an arbitrary metaph\s-
ical theory of the will? And if the values of the will are to be re-
constructed out of phenomenal motives, how shall we escape the
logical or causal methods?
Space will not permit of a detailed criticism of the errors of anal-
ysis involved in the statement that volition is not consciousness of ends,
the most far-reaching of which is the failure to distinguish between
different degrees of consciousness of ends. We must confine our notice
to some of the logical consequences of the general position which make
it so out of harmony with the prevalent theories of value. Having
abandoned the basis of the ' continuity' theories of value which define
value as that which is desired, and therefore all modifications of value
as development of desire, Schwartz's classes of value lack all genetic,
phenomenal relationship to each other.
To make an absolute distinction between Values of Condition, Per-
sonal Values, and Impersonal Values, he is compelled to use the con-
ception of feeling, ' Gefiihlsdisposition,' in an arbitrarily narrow sense,
to confine it to the grossly organic conditions of the organism with
the strong consciousness of pleasure and pain. These are passive
states, desired, while the personal values, such as power, fame,
beauty, courage (the ethical sentiments in general), are objects of an
active effort, streben, the value of which is determined by the act of
will itself.
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The author here betrays an unusually superficial acquaintance both
with these sentiments themselves and with the psychology of the
sentiments when he ignores entirely the prevalent and probable ex-
planation of their relative independence of subjective conditions, by
processes of abstraction, and by the objectification of the social con-
sciousness. And here it may be remarked that a neglect of the so-
cial factor in the creation of values is characteristic of the work.
As a consequence of this absolute dualism, an entire group of sen-
timents, wonder, reverence, sympathy, which represent a more objec-
tive reference of consciousness, and yet do not fall into the personal and
impersonal group, are described as neutral, and denied all further par-
ticipation in the scheme of values, although manifestly occupying a
transition stage between the lower feelings and the higher sentiments of
personal and impersonal value. These values of consciousness are,
once and for all, states of consciousness, and a psychological method
which shall explain them must be genetic and empirical. It may not
be possible to explain the degrees of value and the development of
values by the law of relative increase of pleasure, which Schwartz insists
is no ' real force,' nor even perhaps by the quasi-logical conception of
greatest possible extent and intension of sentiments (Guyau, Kriigrer).
Nevertheless, it is no help to our psychology of values to tread the aban-
doned paths of the old faculty psychology, to assume 'real forces'for
every relative distinction of value we may make in the content of con-
sciousness. The Kingdom of Science is not to be taken by storm.
As for the general methodological principles which underlie the
entire work, we find them leading to a result which puts the science
of ethics in the precarious position of choosing between the alternative
of a groundless will, or at least one whose real grounds cannot be
known, or of a transcendentalism, whose categories not only bring no
deduction with them to certify their truth, but whose limits, even, are
not clearly defined. There seems to be in the present state of our
thinking two methods of value determination with which every thinker
should set himself to rights. Both are monistic—and admit of no dis-
continuity of value. Genetic naturalism conceives of all higher values
as expansions and modifications of the lower values oi ' condition' de-
termined by the laws of the social consciousness. The idealistic method
conceives even the values of condition as well as personal and over-in-
dividual values as capable of systematization under the concept of an
ideal self. In his absolute dualism between the lower and the higher
values Schwartz has run counter to the dearest hopes of both schools
of thought, and his work will probably be judged accordingly.
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